

One aspect of this theory was that there once was an ancient kingdom of Azerbaijan which incorporated parts of northern Iran. This ancient kingdom, according to this theory, was divided into southern and northern parts as a result of a Russo-Iranian plot. Needless to say anyone even superficially familiar with the history of the region and the Russo-Iranian wars realizes the falsity of this theory. Be that as it may, years of Soviet propaganda have inculcated this vision into the minds of many Azerbaijanis who see the unification of the so-called Northern and Southern Azerbaijan as a principal national goal.

11. See Thomas L. Friedman "US To Counter Iran in Central Asia," *New York Times*, 6 Feb. 1992.
12. See Shireen T. Hunter, "The Muslim Republics of the Former Soviet Union: Policy Challenges for the United States," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1992.
13. For an analysis of the Iranian situation in this period, see Shireen T. Hunter, *Iran After Khomeini* (New York: Praeger, 1992).
14. On Özal's statement and the reaction of Turkish politicians to it, see "Özal, Yılmaz far apart on Azerbaijan," *Turkish Daily News*, 20–21 Jan. 1990.
15. The Popular Front of Azerbaijan initially was a more mixed group incorporating pan-Turkist nationalists as well as other elements. But later it became dominated by the nationalists. Consequently many of its members left and formed other groups. For information on the origins of the group see Mirza Michaeli, "Formation of Popular Front of Azerbaijan," *Radio Liberty Research*, 9 Dec. 1988.
16. This issue was hotly debated during the June 1992 presidential election campaign when I was visiting Baku as part of an election observation team.
17. See for example, Jim Hoagland "Security in the Neighborhoods is the New Mission," *International Herald Tribune*, 26 Oct. 1993. After noting that the Russians expect the West to be a helping hand in reasserting their influence in the south or at least understanding of their actions, the author mentions that this "has led to debate in Western capitals among those who fear a rebirth of Russian imperialism and those who would give Mr. Yeltsin a relatively free hand in his own neighborhood if that is what is needed to save his government in Moscow." He then goes on to say that "The latter approach is the right one." ■

Georgian-Armenian Relations in 1918–20 and 1991–94: A Comparison

Stephen F. Jones

If Armenia is strangled, that puts an end to the possibility of Georgian independence.

—Iraklii Tsereteli¹

Historically, Georgian-Armenian relations have been characterized by both interdependence and rivalry. Migrations, religious conflict, foreign intervention, and imperial clashes have led over the two millennia of Georgian-Armenian history to alliances between the two peoples against Islamic threats. Yet at the same time they have fought wars, either as military auxiliaries of rival empires or as warring kingdoms. Both peoples are Christian, which created a natural solidarity against neighboring Muslim states, but they were also bitter ecclesiastical rivals after the Georgians split with the Armenian monophysites in 607.² Originally both peoples shared the same dynastic rulers—the House of Bagratuni or Bagrationi, and for a time were part of what Cyril Toumanoff calls a "dynastic condominium" in Caucasia, but by the eleventh century rival branches of the Bagratunis in Iberia (Eastern Georgia), Ani, and Lori were fighting one another for the favor of the Caliphate or Byzantium.³ There are also close cultural links in Georgian-Armenian folklore, architecture, art, and literature, but these commonalities have frequently led to disputes between Georgian and Armenian historians over the originality and superiority of their own culture.⁴

These patterns of rivalry have contributed to the vulnerability of both peoples to imperial designs. The Armenians, under the pressure of conflicts between the Byzantines, Persians, Arabs, and Seljuks, lost their statehood on the Armenian Plateau in the eleventh century.⁵ The

collapse of Armenia contributed to the success of the Mongolian invasion of Georgia in the thirteenth century, which reduced the powerful Georgian kingdom of Queen Tamara (1184–1212) to disputatious feudatories. These Georgian statelets were finally reunited at the beginning of the nineteenth century by Russian colonialism.⁶ The manipulation of Georgian-Armenian rivalries continued under the Russian empire, as both communities vied for Russian patronage, made conflicting claims over territory, or squabbled about historical monuments.⁷

This paper is not a history of Georgian-Armenian relations; rather it is an exploration of major issues in their relationship. Relations between two peoples or states occur in a range of areas at different levels, but as Barry Buzan suggests, those between peoples or states with interdependent security interests which cannot project their power beyond immediate neighbors have particular intensity.⁸ Neighboring states, such as Armenia and Georgia in the Middle Ages or the independent republics of the twentieth century, may have common interests, but there is also a wider range of issues over which they may differ. Interdependence, contiguity, and ethnocultural similarities are just as likely, if not more likely, to create enmity as amity, particularly in contexts like Caucasia where weaker states use competing larger powers to establish their legitimacy and boundaries.⁹ The weakness of small states also encourages foreign powers to use them against one another. There is considerable theoretical literature on the problems of contiguity, and illustrations of conflict between neighboring states on every continent are plentiful¹⁰. It is striking that it is in the areas of purported shared interest between Georgia and Armenia—history, security, geography, transport, economy, Western orientation—that relations have been most tense with one another as independent states.

Georgians and Armenians have lived as neighboring peoples and in contiguous states for over two millennia. Patterns of distrust and rivalry established in the Middle Ages, and the conflicts between them in the nineteenth century over territorial rights, language, property ownership, and political representation contributed to the suspicion which characterized relations between the two states in 1918–20 and again from 1991 onwards. The focus of this paper is on the two periods of statehood in this century, but we cannot understand Georgian-Armenian state relations without some knowledge of the history of communal interaction over many centuries.

RELATIONS AS PEOPLES: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

After the collapse of the last Armenian state on the Armenian Plateau in the eleventh century, Armenians and Georgians lived as neighboring peoples within the Ottoman and Russian empires, or within independent Georgian kingdoms. From the Middle Ages on, Armenians

were caught like the Georgians in the “shatter zone” between Christian and Islamic civilizations. They often sought refuge in Georgian territories, migrating to the southwestern regions of Georgia (Meskhet-Javakheti) or to Georgian towns. They were encouraged by Georgian kings such as Vakhtang Gorgasali (450–503) and David II (the “Builder,” 1089–1125) to shore up the Christian population in depopulated Georgian areas or to stimulate commercial activity in the towns. There was a second, larger wave of Armenian immigration in the eighteenth century when Erekle II (1744–98) of Kartli-Kakheti, worried about his kingdom’s demographic situation, invited three Armenian Karabagh meliks and their serfs to settle in Marneuli, Bolnisi, and Tetrichqaro regions in lower Kartli, south of Tbilisi. Armenians were also invited to settle in Sighnakhi, Dusheti, Akhagori, and Telavi.¹¹ Mass immigration of Armenians only began in the nineteenth century, when as a result of the Russo-Turkish wars of 1828–29 and 1878–89 and Ottoman repression in the 1890s, Armenian refugees were permitted to settle in Meskhet-Javakheti, Trialeti, Tbilisi, and on the west Georgian coast around Sukhumi and Batumi, where there had been a large exodus of Muslim Abkhazians to Ottoman lands after the 1828–29 war. According to Richard Hovannisian, by 1830 most of the one hundred thousand Armenians who fled the Ottoman Empire after the war settled in the newly acquired regions of Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe, lands historically claimed by the Georgians.¹² Between 1897 and 1902, following repression of Armenians by Sultan Abdülhamid and Kurdish irregulars, Armenian immigration to Georgia increased to around 55,000, and from 1897 to 1910 the Armenian population of Tbilisi increased from 46,700 to almost 125,000. Sixty-eight thousand of the newcomers came from outside Georgia.¹³ The final Armenian wave came after the massacres of 1915 when around 250,000 Armenians escaped to Russia, many of whom settled in Georgia’s southern regions.

Until the beginning of the nineteenth century when Georgian territories were annexed to the Russian Empire, Armenians were on the whole well integrated into Georgian administrative and business life. The seventeenth-century missionary Don Kristoforo de Casteli observed that “all kings from Georgia . . . use numerous Armenians in their administration,” and Cyril Toumanoff, one of the best medieval scholars of the region, writes that Georgian kings “entrusted, to the very end of the Georgian polity, their chanceries to houses of Armenian origin and often conducted their correspondence with foreign monarchs in Armenian.”¹⁴ Armenians played a role similar to that of the Greek and Jewish merchants in the Ottoman Empire, exploiting their commercial and diplomatic contacts in the Armenian diaspora to control most of Georgia’s trade. They were well represented in the military aristocracy which ruled East Georgian kingdoms and, by the eighteenth century,

occupied the prominent and traditionally hereditary post of melik-mamasakhlisi, a sort of economic governor in Tbilisi. They dominated the "mokalake" (citizen) institution in the cities, a prestigious group of wealthy merchants, who although serfs of the Georgian kings, were extremely powerful in political life. The "amkrebi" or craft guilds were also predominantly Armenian.¹⁵

Despite the assimilation of some Armenians into Georgian political and cultural life, foreign travelers to Caucasia from as early as the seventeenth century testify to a mutual distrust between the Georgian and Armenian communities.¹⁶ Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Erekle II's attempt to halt his kingdom's economic decline by imposing heavy taxes on trade led to Armenian resentment. Some sought the occupation of Georgia by either Agha Mohammed Khan of Persia or the Russians, to provide better security for their trade. Paul I of Russia, in one of the first of many imperial attempts to use one Caucasian group against another, promised the Armenians a separate home within Georgia.¹⁷ The strong attachment, particularly in the Armenian case, to their separate faiths, and the emerging social differences between an Armenian mercantile class and Georgian nobles in the cities reinforced ethnic and cultural differentiation. This was accentuated in the nineteenth century by the rise of nationalism, a new competitive social structure based on the market, the urbanization of Georgians, the influx of large numbers of Armenian refugees, and czarist settlement policies favoring Armenians.¹⁸ The growing urban Georgian intelligentsia and the declining Georgian nobility, influenced by European ideas of ethnocentrism and self-determination and longing for the restoration of Georgia's golden age, resented Armenians who controlled Georgian economic life. Although the vast majority of Armenians in Georgia were peasants like Georgians themselves, Armenians visibly dominated all levels of trade from the richer factory owners to middle merchants and craftsmen. Luigi Villari, visiting Tiflis in 1905 declared:¹⁹

Armenians control all the commercial activity of the town. One has only to walk down the main streets to see that the names over all the major shops and of the most important firms are Armenian. . . .

The Georgians, on the other hand, have lost much of their wealth. . . . Tiflis has thus become one of the most important centres of Armenian nationalism.²⁰

Due to an electoral system based on property qualifications, Armenians played a dominant role in Georgian local government and became easy and visible targets for Georgia's nationalists and socialists. The Georgian newspaper *Droeba* decried them as people "who strip

our streets and fatten their pockets . . . [and] buy the last piece of . . . property from our indebted peasant families."²¹

Ilia Chavchavadze (1837-1907), the most influential literary figure in Georgia in the nineteenth century, expressed in an essay on Georgian-Armenian relations the feelings of the Georgian intelligentsia at the time. (Many of his views continue to characterize current Georgian attitudes toward Armenians.) With the disdain typical of the Georgian nobility, he attacked Armenians for their mercantile attitude. "Poverty is not a sin. The sin is when you eat the bread baked by someone else or drink that which is created by another's sweat." Echoing the sentiments of the Georgian poet Akaki Tsereteli (1840-1915), who in one fable had portrayed Armenians as a flea sucking Georgian blood, Chavchavadze compared Armenian and Georgian proverbs to show that Armenians were parasitic in Georgia. Their claims on Georgian lands, by which Chavchavadze meant the southern districts of Akhalkalaki and Akhaltsikhe, "soils our identity and annuls our history." He cited examples of the Armenian intelligentsia physically erasing Georgian history by substituting Georgian symbols and scripts on historical monuments with Armenian ones. Armenians deserve to have their own state, he went on, but "they should not take what is not theirs." He touched a raw nerve, which later became a vital security issue for Georgian leaders in 1918-21 and 1991-94, when he accused Armenians of threatening Georgia's internal security. "Rather than have an enemy within, it is better to confront a lion without," he declared.²²

In the 1890s, Georgian-Armenian relations became particularly inflamed as Chavchavadze's old newspaper *Iveria* led unsuccessful Georgian electoral campaigns in 1890 and 1893 to unseat the Armenian majority in the Tiflis city Duma. It led to a boycott of local elections by the Georgian community and a vitriolic dispute in the Georgian press which portrayed the Armenians as sly moneylenders and unscrupulous traders.²³ By the turn of the century, the Georgian and Armenian communities, both of which centered their activities in Tiflis were, as one local commentator put it, "two societies, two intelligentsias, living in parallel but without any contact with one another, not knowing one another and not interested in mutual acquaintance."²⁴

Such coexistence within a single territory, as Donald Horowitz notes, "is a discomforting condition, conducive to periodic, sometimes violent, attempts to restore homogeneity."²⁵ Georgian elites in late-nineteenth-century Georgia felt Armenian migration, economic superiority, and political control of the capital's urban life excluded them from their rightful status in Georgia and constituted a block on their future prospects.

There were levels on which relations were not conflictual. At times, Armenian and Georgian workers or tradesmen struck together against employers or czarist repression, as in 1865 when a tax was imposed on Tiflis craft guilds. And as Ronald Suny has shown, there were strong social and regional conflicts within as well as between ethnic communities.²⁶ But by 1917 it was clear that even socialism could not eradicate the divisions between the two communities. The two major parties in Georgia—the Georgian section of the RSDLP (Russian Social Democratic Labor Party) and the Armenian Dashnaktsutiun—were on the eve of czarism's downfall, despite their socialist aspirations, monoethnic national liberation movements. They were, like many of the successful socialist movements which have emerged in the postcolonial world, essentially ethnocentric rather than internationalist. Georgian socialist attacks on the bourgeoisie and imperialism were a rallying call for the liberation of Georgia not only from Russian czarism, but from Armenian exploitation. Like the Czechs in Prague or the Lithuanians in Vilnius (Wilno), the Georgians wanted to retake their capital city and reassert Georgian political hegemony. Noe Zhordania, the leader of Georgia's socialists wrote that in Europe, "the town is a national town, and each quarter is suffused with the national soul. . . . Tiflis is lacking this general influence. Here you cannot tell to which people or to which region Tiflis belongs. . . . The town is economically Armenian, administratively Russian, and Georgians occupy only lowly positions."²⁷

World War I and revolution in Caucasia intensified economic and security threats to the population, and put new strains on the relationship between Armenians and Georgians. The Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes of 1905 and the Genocide of 1915 in the Ottoman Empire focused Armenian security concerns on Turkey and on the neighboring Azerbaijanis in eastern Caucasia. But the events of 1917–18 showed that Armenians and Georgians remained suspicious of one another at all levels of social and political interaction. In the absence of Russian control and security, Georgian-Armenian rivalry revolved around new and urgent themes of self-government, territory, the ethnic distribution of power, confiscation of church lands, party representation, and relations with neighboring states such as Turkey and Russia, or with the Great Powers Germany and Great Britain.

From February 1917 to May 1918, Georgians and Armenians participated in a series of multiethnic regional coalitions in Caucasia which attempted to fill the political vacuum left by the collapse of Russia. All of these attempts at cooperation, embodied by the Ozakom (Extraordinary Transcaucasian Committee), Transcaucasian Commissariat, Tiflis Soviet, and the Democratic Federative Republic of Transcaucasia, revealed a conflict of interests between the two communities. Almost all political forums became a source of bitter rivalry and intrigue. Ar-

menian demands for national territorial autonomy in Turkish Armenia, their insistence on remaining within the Russian sphere, their strong links with the Bolsheviks (especially in Baku) and faith in the Allies, contrasted with Georgians' consistent hostility to Bolshevism, disillusion with Russia, cooperation with the Azerbaijanis and the Central Powers, and willingness to sacrifice Armenian territorial claims in Turkey to ensure Georgian state integrity.

It would be wrong to treat each community as politically and socially cohesive units—there were major disagreements and splits within each on economic and social issues—but the areas of potential political or social alliance between socialists, liberals, or patriots from the two communities in 1917–18 never overcame the primacy of ethnic allegiance or the centuries-old distrust between them.

INTERSTATE RELATIONS: 1918–21

The experiment in Caucasian federalism collapsed in May 1918. Armenians, Georgians, and Azerbaijanis accused one another of treachery in peace negotiations with the Ottomans, and the latter, taking advantage of the Russian retreat, seized swathes of Caucasian territory including Kars, Ardahan, Batumi, and much of the Yerevan province. Threatened by territorial dismemberment, Georgia concluded a secret deal with Germany to protect itself against the Ottomans and declared independence on 26 May 1918. Azerbaijani leaders quickly followed suit and the Armenians reluctantly declared self-determination on 30 May. The circumstances could hardly have been worse for all three republics, particularly for Armenia which was reduced to 4,500 square miles of barren land based on the former province of Yerevan. By contrast, the Georgian capital of Tiflis had been the center of the czarist Caucasian administration, the node of its transport networks and markets, and contained the administrative and economic infrastructure of the former colonial power. It was also the center of Armenian cultural and political life.

The tasks faced by both states were similar. Inexperienced leaders had to create new security structures, forge new legitimacies, restructure the economy, and establish new alliances, all within the context of renewed imperial threats, internal ethnic revolts, starving refugees, and economic blockade. Such structural and developmental problems had a vital impact on relations between the two states. As weak and small states operating in a post-imperial vacuum, Georgian and Armenian leaders were most concerned about national security, which in the context of regional and internal crises become inseparable from domestic stability. Threatening internal challenges from economic to secessionist, the tasks of national consolidation, and the baying of opposition groups for national unity led to assertive nationalist govern-

ments. Given the ruling parties' socialist leanings and the absence of private resources, both governments saw an active state as the best mechanism for overcoming internal weakness and ensuring development. Indigenization programs, economic nationalization, control of foreign trade, and the regulation of minority activity became essential parts of the national task of both states. But such policies, to be expected in struggling and insecure states, only intensified their security problems with one another.

The Georgian social democratic government, ideologically hostile to big business, shared the Georgian nationalist suspicion that the half-million Armenians who dominated the capital city, occupied strategic border areas, and controlled much of the economy were primarily loyal to the new Republic of Armenia. Their suspicions seemed to be confirmed by the events of October and December 1918, when the majority-Armenian district of Lori on Georgia's southern border supported the Armenian government's attempt to annex the district. At the same time, Armenians in the southern district of Akhalkalaki appealed to the Armenian government for protection against alleged abuses by the Georgian administration. Subsequently, Georgian leaders blamed Armenians for participating in revolts in Abkhazia and in General Denikin's attempts to occupy Georgian territory in the northwest.²⁸ Georgian official abuses such as the confiscation of Armenian property or mistreatment by the police, and the Georgian government's own nationalization and requisition policies which deprived Armenians of their former economic and political privileges in Tbilisi soured Armenian-Georgian relations throughout the independence period. Georgian leaders, in the early stages of nation-state formation and unable to mobilize economic and political resources to overcome domestic violence, were extremely sensitive to internal security threats. Faced as the Georgian leaders were by a number of secessionist movements between 1918 and 1921 from the Abkhazians and South Ossetians, it was inevitable that the perceived disloyalty of Armenians and their hankering for a closer alliance with Russia would make them a national security issue for Georgia. Georgian leaders began to see Armenians as a potential "fifth column," subject to manipulation by foreign powers wishing to take advantage of Georgia's weakness. When, in March 1919, a strike broke out among Tiflis white-collar workers, many of whom were Armenian, Georgian leaders saw this as an example of Armenian perfidy, a stab in the back at a time of crisis.²⁹ It was unfortunate that in Georgia, as one Georgian Social Democrat put it, "class war takes on national form," but the identification of dissident culprits with a foreign state was a useful weapon for the Georgian government, unable to provide economic or political security for its citizens.³⁰

The Georgians could not ignore the Armenian government's threats to incorporate Georgian territory. Inexperienced Armenian leaders, facing territorial threats from Turkey and Azerbaijan, were driven like the Georgians by the belief that territory equaled security. Armenian leaders nurtured a historical vision of a Greater homeland which conflicted with the Georgians' own. The clash of these two visions, Armenian resentments against Georgian treatment of their coethnics, the uncertainty of state borders, and the opportunity to gain from a neighboring state's weakness were among the major factors which led to Armenia's attempt to seize Lori in December 1918. Armenian leaders believed that the Allies sympathized with their claims. But the decision to go to war weakened Armenian security. It encouraged Georgian hostility, diverted resources from other economic and military needs, worsened the situation of their own coethnics in Georgia, increased their isolation in the region, and undermined supporters of pro-Armenian intervention among the Allies.

There were other issues between the two states, which like boundaries, diasporas, and history, reflected problems of interdependence and contiguity. Armenia's dependence on Georgian supply routes for food and energy was a continual source of conflict. There was wrangling over the division of imperial spoils and competition for Allied support, including slanderous attacks on one another in full view of the Allies in Paris. But by the fall of 1919, despite political friction between the Georgian Social Democratic party and the Dashnaktsutun, interdependence also became a source of cooperation. The costs of conflict for interdependent states like Georgia and Armenia—loss of trade, expenditure on border defense, and the absence of mutual security against common threats—became apparent as the Russian civil war lapped at their borders and the Allies threatened to pull out of the region. Armenians, who had removed themselves from most Caucasian regional agreements, including transit and peace treaties between Azerbaijan and Georgia in December 1918 and July 1919, joined the Caucasian Railway and Postal Convention in the autumn of 1919, and in November, after agreements on the administration of disputed territorial zones with Georgia, signed arbitration and transit treaties.³¹

But such cooperation began to fray as Georgia and Armenia sought to maintain their territorial integrity against Kemalist Turkey and Bolshevik Russia. Ostensibly, the Red Army's takeover of Azerbaijan in April 1920, the emerging alliance between Turkey and Russia, and the Bolshevik-inspired revolts in both countries should have brought Armenia and Georgia closer together. But as in May 1918, separation rather than cooperation was seen as the route to survival. Both Georgia and Armenia sought separate deals with Moscow in April and May 1920. Armenia held out for Allied intervention, despite the latter's obvious

powerlessness, until September 1920 when the Turkish invasion forced Armenia back into the Russian orbit. Georgia, concerned with the flow of oil from Baku, quickly signed separate peace and trade treaties with Soviet Azerbaijan in June and November, continued to hold up supplies to Armenia, and with the fall of independent Armenia, reoccupied disputed territory in Lori. It was from Armenian-populated Lori that the Soviet Eleventh Army launched its invasion of Georgia in February 1921, yet another proof to Georgians that Armenians were hostile to Georgia.

The Red Army's occupation of Armenia in December 1920 and Georgia in February 1921 ended Georgian-Armenian interstate relations. Thereafter, conflict between the leaders of both republics was within the Soviet context—in the Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (1922–36), in regional Communist party and state bodies, or in Moscow. Rivalry over representation at the center, republican powers, resource distribution, investment, and conditions of the Armenian diaspora was sustained by the Soviet federal structure and indigenization policies, which encouraged the identification of powerful politico-cultural elites with their republics' economic and political interests. The command economy, characterized by shortages, encouraged economic nationalism at the republican level, and in the Caucasian republics, educational and cultural policies led to domination by the titular culture, causing minorities like the Armenians in Georgia to complain of linguistic, educational, and job discrimination.³² Georgians, on the other hand, resented minorities who seemed to claim disproportionate influence and rights compared to their size.³³

The rapid economic decline and reduced influence of Moscow brought about by perestroika intensified Armenian fears that without the tempering influence of the center they would become a permanent and powerless minority in Georgia. The rise of Georgian nationalist parties from 1988 onwards and the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, which Georgians felt might inspire their own Armenian enclaves, led to increasing tension between the two communities. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the same shaky foundations which had characterized Armenian-Georgian interstate relations on the eve of independence in 1918 were apparent once again.

INTERSTATE RELATIONS 1991–1994

The framework of the Georgian-Armenian relationship since both states gained independence in 1991 is strikingly similar to that of 1918–21. New governments face the tremendous task of state building in the midst of economic chaos, political revolution, and war. Both have to build new structures on the ruins of an empire which left a legacy in society of political intolerance and organizational inexperience.

ence. Since 1991, both governments have tried to reorganize national and local government structures, introduce new electoral, citizenship, and language laws, rewrite constitutions, create armies, reform land tenure, and reconstruct the economy.³⁴ As in 1918–21, these pressing state-building measures in Georgia have led to conflict with local Armenians. Some of these conflicts are driven by Armenian anxiety with Georgian nationalist parties and their programs, others by discriminatory laws or Georgian officials' abuse of their power. Whatever the veracity of Armenian accusations of oppression under Georgian governments today, they echo those of 1918–21. They are the result of historical distrust, but also of the structural and political imperatives which also drove Georgian leaders in 1918—the need to build a strong national state.

There have been basically three phases in Georgian leadership attitudes towards the Armenian minority (and ethnic minorities generally) since the emergence of perestroika: from 1988 to 1990 under national communist leadership; from October 1990 to December 1991 under Zviad Gamsakhurdia; and since March 1992 under Eduard Shevardnadze. The different policies in each phase had an impact on Georgian-Armenian relations, but all were within the broader context of Georgian national assertiveness. All Georgian leaders since 1988 have responded to nationalist demands from below as well as to the need to create Georgian, rather than Soviet, institutions. Thus between 1988 and 1989, although Georgian Communist leaders resisted the more extreme nationalist demands being pressed upon them by the new "informals," they approved a series of measures such as the settlement of displaced Georgians in non-Georgian areas and the creation of national military units. They introduced a Georgian Language State Program in August 1989 which promoted Georgian in education and administration, and made Georgian the "working language" of parliament. A new law restricted immigration and an electoral law forbade the registration of regionally based parties, thereby depriving territorially compact ethnic populations such as the Armenians in Akhalkalaki of separate representation in parliament.³⁵

Many ethnic minorities, including Armenians, saw such laws as discriminatory, but a closer look at many of these measures suggest that the majority did not breach civil rights, although they reflected primarily Georgian interests.³⁶ Much more alarming during this first phase for Armenians was the rise of militant Georgian nationalist organizations, such as the All-Georgian Merab Kostava Society, or Gamsakhurdia's Round Table–Free Georgia Bloc which took an aggressively "anti-immigrant" attitude. Both nearly brought Armenians and Georgians in Ninotsminda (formerly Bogdanovka) district into armed conflict over disputed land in the summer of 1990.³⁷ It was hardly surprising

that in the 1990 October elections, many Armenian districts returned Communist party members rather than vote for Gamsakhurdia's nationalist representatives.³⁸

The victory of Zviad Gamsakhurdia's Round Table-Free Georgia Bloc in the October 1990 elections led to a more militant phase of state building, rhetorically at least. The colonial legacy of a weak and ethnically divided state lacking political foundation or legitimacy, and a worsening domestic situation led Gamsakhurdia, like many radical populists before him, to stress national unity, patriotism, traditionalism, and a strong state. For Gamsakhurdia, the state embodied the Georgian nation, and ethnic minorities such as the Armenians were "guests," or at worst "aliens," who threatened Georgia with dismemberment. But Gamsakhurdia's chauvinistic rhetoric, his glorification of national symbols, and centralization of power weakened the state by polarizing society and alienating national minorities. Georgian-Armenian relations deteriorated significantly as he introduced Georgian prefects in Armenian districts, reduced regional autonomy, endorsed evangelizing Georgian Orthodoxy, financed Georgian settlers in non-Georgian areas, postponed land privatization (fearing land would end up in non-Georgian hands), and accused Armenians of disloyalty.³⁹

Under Shevardnadze, the political climate for Armenians improved. He tempered Georgianization programs with the creation of multiethnic bodies such as a parliamentary commission and a state committee to protect minority rights. He appointed regional representatives from among the local nationalities and created a Georgian Constitutional Council to include all non-Georgians in the discussion of a new constitution. His speeches, in contrast to those of Gamsakhurdia, stressed equal rights for all citizens, and he was able to diffuse much of the chauvinistic hysteria in the press.⁴⁰ But at the same time, the Georgian parliament has not passed any important laws on the national question; the new electoral system in October 1992 produced only two Armenian deputies to represent Georgia's half a million Armenians, and no deputy was elected in Tbilisi where over 150,000 Armenians live. Other tensions continue over the government's twenty-kilometer military zone in Armenian districts that border Turkey and Armenia, over land ownership in Ninotsminda, and neglect of Armenian hostages taken from Georgia and held in Azerbaijan. The Georgian army's inability to protect the vital gas pipeline which passes through Georgian territory to Armenia or to restore order in Dmanisi where the Armenian community has complained of intimidation by Georgians resettled from Svanetia has led, as in 1918–20, to a tense exchange of diplomatic notes between the Georgian and Armenian governments.⁴¹

The war against Abkhazian separatists, which ended in Georgian defeat in September 1993, also damaged Georgian-Armenian relations. In an echo of 1918–21, the Armenian community in Abkhazia, which in 1989 numbered over seventy-six thousand (14.6 percent of the total Abkhazian population), was accused of cooperating with anti-Georgian forces, although this time with Abkhazian separatists rather than with the Russian Volunteer Army. An Armenian organization in Abkhazia, Krunk, called for Abkhazian independence and organized volunteers to fight on the Abkhazian side.⁴² Georgian units in turn were accused of expelling numbers of the thirty-five thousand Armenians living in the Ochamchire, Sukhumi, and Gulprishi districts during the Abkhazian campaign; this led to an Armenian government visit to the area in August and September 1992.⁴³

This last point illustrates the interconnection of Georgian-Armenian state relations with Georgian domestic policy. The way in which the Armenian diaspora is treated in Georgia contributes significantly to the nature of Georgian-Armenian interstate relations. The improvement in domestic relations between Georgians and Armenians under Shevardnadze, despite continuing tensions over the role of minorities in the new state structures, has been paralleled by better interstate relations. The more cooperative Armenians become in Georgia, the less threatening they seem abroad; conversely, the better interstate relations are, the less defensive Georgia's Armenians need to be. But despite Shevardnadze's success in improving relations with Armenia, exemplified by a series of cooperative agreements signed in June 1992, the establishment of full diplomatic relations the following July, and the signing of a Friendship Treaty on Cooperation and Mutual Security in May 1993, interstate relations, as in 1918–21, remain strained.⁴⁴ This pattern can be partly explained by the problems of domestic instability and state building, but as in 1918–21, there are distinct strategic conflicts between the two countries.

In contrast to both Azerbaijan and Georgia, Armenia has remained an enthusiastic member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) since its inception and encouraged the retention of Russian troops within the republic. Despite Armenian president Levon Ter Petrosian's attempt to broaden his country's relations with Turkey and Iran, the alliance with the Russian-led CIS reflects the vulnerability Armenians have always felt in Caucasia, surrounded by potentially hostile Muslim states and dependent on Azerbaijan and Georgia for energy. In 1918–20 both Georgia and Azerbaijan blocked kerosene and grain supplies, and after 1991, Azerbaijan and Gamsakhurdia's Georgia cut Armenia's rail links with Russia. The Armenian government has also criticized Shevardnadze for raising transit prices, for failing to dispatch to Armenia supplies stockpiled in Georgia's western ports, and for his

government's inattention to the pilfering of goods destined for Armenian refugees. The Georgian government's inability to prevent the destruction of the pipeline which carries gas to Armenia, blown up seven times in 1993, led to an angry statement from the Armenian government in February 1994. It hoped that the "Georgian government will be more serious about Georgian-Armenian relations," and suggested that "certain Georgian forces . . . are striving to settle their own economic difficulties at the expense of their neighbors."⁴⁵

Georgia, in contrast to Armenia's trade and security dependence on Russia and its Caucasian neighbors, has access to shipping routes on the Black Sea, greater potential for Western investment due to its geographical location, a rich but undeveloped agricultural base, and more pragmatic relations with neighboring Muslim states. The Bolshevik invasion of Georgia in 1921 and Georgia's entry into the CIS in December 1993 under Russian military and economic pressure suggest there are limits to Georgia's freedom of action. But its favorable geographical location, strategic transport network, and ports have always been important in securing alliances outside the Caucasian region. For example, use of Georgia's railways was a distinct incentive for the Germans to sign the Georgian-German treaty of 1918, which protected Georgia from Turkish aggression. The economic agreements with Iran in the summer of 1992 also mentioned Iranian use of Georgia's transport. In return Georgia received economic aid and strengthened ties with a potential regional ally.⁴⁶ Its geographical position has also made it an attractive member of the embryonic Black Sea Economic Cooperation organization and drawn it closer to Turkey, which like Iran can be an important balance against Russian influence.

Armenia undoubtedly remains important to Georgia's security. Half a million Armenians live in Georgia and Georgia's cooperation is vital for the prevention of an Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict on Georgia's southern borders, which would spell disaster for Georgia. Armenia is also potentially important as a counterweight to Azerbaijan. But as in 1918–21, Georgia has good reason to give Azerbaijan priority, reflected in the greater attention it has given to treaties and agreements with Azerbaijan compared to Armenia.⁴⁷ Georgia's trade with Azerbaijan—primarily oil and gas—has always been vital to Georgia. In December 1992, Shevardnadze, unwilling to risk losing Georgia's energy supplies, promised Azerbaijani president Elchibei not to pass on Azerbaijani oil to any third party.⁴⁸ Azerbaijan is also important to Turkish-Georgian relations, and Shevardnadze's long-term strategy of a Eurasian corridor linking Central Asia and China with Europe will clearly involve Azerbaijan. Armenia, given its poor relations with Muslim states, would complicate this strategy.

Georgia's pragmatic interest in maintaining good relations with Azerbaijan was expressed by Shevardnadze in January 1993. He declared: "Our interests complement each other. We need their railroads if we want to remain in contact with Russia and the other CIS states. They need our Black Sea ports if they want to export anything to the West."⁴⁹

Armen Khanbabian, writing in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, suggested that this was a much more realistic basis for interstate relations than common religion. Georgia's "preference for relations with Baku," he argued, led to its "participation in the gas blockade of Armenia and its selling of military aviation technology to Azerbaijan."⁵⁰ While the blockade has ceased under Shevardnadze, the pragmatic basis for the Georgian-Azerbaijani alliance has not. As in 1918–20, this has made Armenia skeptical of pan-Caucasian institutions or agreements, and pan-Caucasian security seems to be as politically implausible for Armenia as it was in 1918–20.⁵¹

A final issue which has exacerbated Georgian-Armenian relations has been the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. Georgia is under threat from its own secessionist movements and strongly supports the inviolability of borders. This has been an essential point in all of Georgia's agreements and communiqués with its neighbors—Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia.⁵² The February 1993 Treaty of Friendship with Azerbaijan calls for "the inviolability of one another's territorial integrity and borders [and] the resolution of problems by peaceful means." It forbids the recruitment of "hired formations" on the territory of either state and provides for "rapid consultations on questions of mutual security."⁵³ Although such stipulations have been counterbalanced with similar articles in the May 1993 Georgian-Armenian treaty, Shevardnadze has publicly described Nagorno-Karabakh's attempt to secede as unconstitutional and against international law. During a visit by the Turkish foreign minister to Tbilisi in May 1992, Shevardnadze declared that the "changing of borders by force and using troops is unacceptable."⁵⁴

In short, as in 1918, the bases for interdependence and a Georgian-Armenian alliance are opposed by powerful strategic and political differences. If Georgia and Armenia were not caught between contending powers with regional ambitions, or did not face such dramatic domestic threats, such strategic differences, normal between neighboring states, might be resolved. But today, as in 1918–21, survival has made raw self-interest and alignment with competing powers one of the decisive factors determining Armenian-Georgian relations.

CONCLUSION

The difference between Armenian-Georgian relations in 1918–20 and 1991–94 remain significant. The post-Soviet environment, in contrast to 1918, gave both republics their own state structures and educated populations. Economic interdependence had advanced well beyond the 1918 stage, and neither state had territorial pretensions against the other. These factors made the transition to normal interstate relations easier in 1991–94 than in 1918.

But the similarity between the situations in 1918–20 and 1991–94 is helpful in explaining the pattern of Armenian-Georgian interstate relations this century. Firstly there are the “structural” similarities. Both states in 1918 and 1991 were weak post-imperial societies. Although Georgia’s internal ethnic problems were worse, Armenia was drawn into conflicts in neighboring states by its diaspora. The need to establish legitimacy, build national state structures, and protect their populations from the catastrophe of economic collapse and domestic violence led to an emphasis on security, national consolidation, and state paternalism in both states. In Georgia, this led in both periods to tension between the Georgian majority and its Armenian minority. Such tension contributed to the Georgian-Armenian war of 1918, and in 1991–94, given other secessionist movements in the country, made domestic Georgian-Armenian disputes potential national security threats. The pattern of fragmentation and instability in both states threatened mutual security and undermined the establishment of a clear institutional framework for interstate relations.

Apart from the structural continuities are the strategic ones. Georgia and Armenia in 1918–21 and again in 1991, from a position of “overlay” by a single power suddenly found themselves in a multipolar situation of contending larger power interests. Armenia’s reluctance to sever its Russian links and its poor relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey brought it into conflict with Georgian state interests in both 1918–21 and 1991–94. Georgia, confident of its ability to attract foreign investment, was more concerned with replacing its dependency on Russia by forging links with interested powers (Germany in 1918, Turkey in 1991–94) or by setting up Caucasian security and economic alliances. Such regional alliances are as yet politically unacceptable to Armenia.

The question therefore still remains as to whether Armenia and Georgia, like European powers before them, can overcome their historical hostility and change the assumptions each has about the behavior of the other. Unfortunately, until the regional conflicts are settled and both states achieve economic and political stability, such mutual confidence will remain elusive. □

17 March 1994

NOTES

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1. Cited in Mikael Varandian, *Le Conflit Arméno-Georgien et la Guerre du Caucase* (Paris: Imprimerie M. Flinikowski, 1991), p. 16.
2. After the Council of Chalcedon in 451, the Armenian church split with Byzantine Orthodoxy and became monophysite. The Georgians, after initially expressing solidarity with the Armenians, formally returned to the Byzantine fold in 607. This led to an acrimonious rupture with the Armenian church. For both political and ecclesiastical background to the Georgian-Armenian split, see Ivane Javakhishvili, *Txulebani t'ormet' t'omad*, vol. I (Tbilisi: Sakartvelos SSR metsnierebata ak'ademiya, 1979), pp. 415–28.
3. For a good account of the early history of Georgia and Armenia and relations between them, see Cyril Toumanoff “Armenia and Georgia,” in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, volume 4, *The Byzantine Empire*, part 1, *Byzantium and its Neighbours* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 593–637. Toumanoff’s phrase is on p. 613. See also his *Studies in Christian Caucasian History* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press, 1963).
4. For a discussion of the common sources of Georgian and Armenian architecture, literature, and art, see Charles Burney and David Lang, *The Peoples of the Hills: Ancient Ararat and Caucasus* (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 226–65.
5. However, the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia, to the south of Cappadocia, lasted until 1375.
6. For the best history in English of this period of Georgian fragmentation, see W. E. D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People: From the Beginning Down to the Russian Conquest in the Nineteenth Century* (1932; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971).
7. Georgians were particularly incensed, for example, by Caucasian viceroy Vorontsov-Dashkov’s agreement to Armenian requests to convene a conference in 1913 on the possible transfer of Akhalkalaki region from Tiflis province to Alexandropol province. See Ivane Javakhishvili, P’ Surguladze, P’rop. List’i (sic), *Ist’oriuli Rarit’et’ebi*, (1919; Tbilisi, 1989), pp. 49–51.
8. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991); see especially ch. 5.
9. The phrase “patterns of enmity and amity,” is used by Buzan to describe the historical pattern of relations between two states. See Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 189.
10. See, for example, Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987); Mohammed Ayoob, ed., *Regional Security in the Third World: Case Studies from Southeast Asia and the Middle East* (London: Croom Helm, 1986); Walter Little, “International Conflict in Latin America,” *International Affairs* 63, no. 4 (1987), pp. 589–601.
11. For information on Armenian immigration to Georgia, see Vakhtang Jaoshvili, *Sakartvelos mosaxleoba XVIII–XX sauk’uneebshi*, (Tbilisi: Metsniereba, 1984), pp. 228–29, and Leonid Melikset-Begi, “Somxebi Sakartveloshi” (Armenians in Georgia)

- (Tbilisi, 1991), pp. 1–22. Melikset-Begi's monograph, (59 pp.) is in Georgian and in manuscript form. The author of this paper has a copy.
12. Richard Hovannisian, *Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1969), p. 9. See also Javakhishvili, Surguladze, P'rop List'i, *Ist'oriuli Rarit'et'ebi*, pp. 48–51, for slightly different figures.
 13. Jaoshvili, *Sakartvelos mosaxleoba XVIII–XX sauk'undebshi*, p. 228, and Melikset-Begi, "Somxebi Sakartveloshi," p. 8.
 14. Don Kristoforo de Castelli, *Tsnobebi da albumi Sakartvelos shesakheb*, trans. and ed. B. Giorgadze (Tbilisi: Metsmereba, 1976), p. 195. Cyril Toumanoff, "Iberia on the Eve of Bagratid Rule: An Inquiry into the Political History of Eastern Georgia Between the VIth and the IXth Century," *Le Museon* 65 (1952), p. 60. This is cited in Ronald Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (London: I. B. Taurus, 1989), p. 34. See also W. E. D. Allen on the particularly prominent role of Armenians in the court of Erekle II. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People*, p. 201.
 15. For the best description in English of the Armenian role in Georgian cities, see Ronald Suny, "Russian Rule and Caucasian Society in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Georgian Nobility and the Armenian Bourgeoisie, 1801–1856," *Nationalities Papers* 7, no. 1, pp. 53–78. See also D. I. Ismail-Zade, *Naselenie gorodov Zakavkazskogo kraia v XIX–nachale XX v.* (Moscow: Izd. Nauka, 1991).
 16. See for example Sir John Chardin, *Voyages de Monsieur Le Chevalier Chardin en Perse et autres Lieux de L'Orient* (Amsterdam, 1711), where he writes on p. 123: "La différence qu'il y a entre leur esprit, leurs moeurs, a causé une forte haine entr'eux. Ils s'abhorrent mutuellement; et ne s'allient jamais ensemble. Les Georgiens particulièrement ont un mépris extrême pour les Arméniens; et les considerent, a peu près, comme on fait les Juifs en Europe." For Russian and foreign views of Armenians through the centuries, see Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., *The Armenian Image in History and Literature* (Malibu, Calif.: Undena Publications, 1981), esp. chapters by Suny and Bardakjian.
 17. See David Marshall Lang, *The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1957), pp. 194–95 and 234–35.
 18. For a review of czarist settlement policies vis-à-vis the Armenians in Georgia, see Melikset-Begi, "Somxebi Sakartveloshi," pp. 9–15. After initially encouraging Armenian settlement in Georgia in the first half of the nineteenth century with financial and property incentives, czarist policy switched in the 1880s to discouragement, especially on the Black Sea coast where they wanted Russian colonization.
 19. Tiflis is the old name for Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia.
 20. Luigi Villari, *Fire and Sword in the Caucasus* (London: Fisher and Unwin, 1906), pp. 109–10. For a more detailed view of Armenian commercial dominance, see Ismail-Zade, *Naselenie gorodov Zakavkazskogo kraia*, chs. 2–3.
 21. Cited in G. Georgadze, *Sazogadoebrivi utiertoba Sakartveloshi 1864–1905* (Tiflis: Saxelmc'ipo gamomcemloba, 1923), p. 371.
 22. All citations from "Kvata ghaghadi" (The stones cry out) are in Ilia C'avc'avadze, *Rcheuli nac'erebi xut t'omad*, vol. 5 (Tbilisi: Sabc'ota Sakartvelo, 1987), pp. 21–111.
 23. For an account of the conflicts between the Georgian and Armenian communities in Tiflis during this period, see G. M. Tumanov, *Zametki o gorodskom samoupravlenii na Kavkaze* (Tiflis, 1902).
 24. A. Avalov in A. I. Kastelianskii, eds., *Formy natsional'nogo dvizheniia v sovremennykh gosudarstvakh* (St. Petersburg, 1910), p. 76.
 25. Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1985), p. 35.

26. See Ronald Suny, *Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993), esp. chs. 1–5.
27. *K'vali*, no. 29, 12 July 1898, p. 481.
28. For account of the Georgian-Armenian war, see Richard Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, vol. 1, *The First Year, 1918–1919*, pp. 65–125. See also the Armenian viewpoint in Varandian, *Le Conflit Arméno-Georgien*, and the Georgian view in General G. I. Kvinitadze, *Vospomianiia 1917–21* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1985), esp. ch. 5.
29. The Georgian Archive (Archives of the Delegation to the Conference of Peace and the Government in Exile), box 3, book 24, p. 30.
30. See R. Arsenadze, "Zadachi professional'nogo dvizheniia v sviazi s perezhivaemym momentom," in the Georgian Archive, box 3, book 24.
31. For extracts from these treaties and an analysis of their significance, see Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Republic of Armenia*, Vol. 2, *From Versailles to London, 1919–1920* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1982), pp. 163–67.
32. Katherine Verdery in her recent book on Romania, *National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1991), suggests that command economies characterized by a shortage of resources and the "nationalization" of Marxism forced competing groups within creative intelligentsias to compete for the state's attention by promoting projects that enhanced the state's national-cultural legitimacy. In the Soviet republics, a similar process led to an officially promoted nationalism among the local political elites. In the late 1950s, Khrushchev's attempt at economic decentralization through regional economic councils (Sovnarkhozi) led to accusations of economic nationalism against republican elites as they directed resources to their own republics to the detriment of others. Republican leaders in Azerbaijan and Latvia were purged as a result. See J. Hough and M. Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979), p. 223.
33. I deal with these issues in my "Revolutions within Revolution: Minorities in the Georgian Republic," in *The Politics of Nationality and the Erosion of the USSR*, ed. Zvi Gitelman (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 77–101.
34. For an assessment of the Georgian and Armenian experience at state building since 1991, see Stephen F. Jones, "Georgia: A Failed Democratic Revolution," and Nora Dudwick, "Armenia: The Nation Awakens," in *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States*, ed. Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1993), pp. 261–87 and 288–310.
35. For an assessment of these laws, see Stephen F. Jones "Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic," *Armenian Review*, 43, no. 2-3/170-171 (Summer/Autumn 1990), pp. 127–52.
36. See for example the Georgian Language State Program, which in contrast to other republican language laws such as the Latvian or Estonian, does not specify which languages can be used in government organizations or set a time limit for public servants to learn Georgian. It does not stipulate which languages must be used in the courts or in enterprises and in non-Georgian regions. Its vagueness and exclusive attention to Georgian, combined with the absence of legislation on national minorities specifying minority language rights, led non-Georgians to view the program as a threat to their social and economic position. But despite the program's neglect of minority concerns, it would be difficult to argue it was a breach of civil rights. For the text of the program, see *K'omunist'i*, 25 Aug. 1989, pp. 3–4.
37. See Jones, "Revolutions within Revolution," p. 91.
38. For the election results by district, see *Zaria Vostoka*, 9 Nov., 14 Nov. 1990.

39. For a discussion of Gamsakhurdia's views on ethnic minorities in Georgia, see my "Populism in Georgia: The Gamsakhurdia Phenomenon," in *Nationalism and History: The Politics of Nation Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia*, ed. Donald V. Schwartz and Razmik Panossian (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1994).
40. See for example, "Shevardnadze Speaks to Sciences Academy on Democracy Building," *Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Soviet Union* (henceforth FBIS-SOV), 92-219 12 Nov. 1992, pp. 95-114, where he says: "The Chairman of the Georgian Parliament, whether it be I or someone else, should be the leader of not only Georgians but also of all peoples living in Georgia."
41. For further discussion of Georgian-Armenian relations in Georgia, see Stephen F. Jones, "The Unbearable Freedom: Georgia on the Precipice," *Armenian International Magazine*, October 1993, pp. 16-21.
42. Other Armenians in Abkhazia, according to Ada Marshania, an Abkhazian deputy in the Georgian parliament, are members of the pro-Georgian Committee for the Salvation of Abkhazia. Armenian organizations in Tbilisi have publicly condemned Krunk's activities in Abkhazia. See for example "Tbilisi Armenians Appeal to Abkhazian Armenians," FBIS-SOV, 91-049, 13 March 1992, p. 86.
43. See "Cossacks to Stay Neutral," FBIS-SOV, 92-165, 25 Aug. 1992, pp. 49-50, and "Armenian Deputies in Sukhumi," FBIS-SOV, 92-170, 1 Sept. 1992, p. 53. In 1919, a Georgian Commission was set up to investigate similar complaints about the Georgian army's "illegal and harmful activities in the Sukhumi region against Armenians." The Georgian Archive, box 5, book 19, p. 157.
44. See "Cooperation Agreements Signed with Armenia," FBIS-SOV, 92-108, 4 June 1992, pp. 98-99. For a report of the issues discussed by the Georgian and Armenian governments during the June 1992 visit of Levon Ter Petrosian to Georgia, see *Sakartvelos Respublik'a*, 9 June 1992, p. 1. On the friendship treaty, see "Treaties signed with Armenia Detailed," FBIS-SOV, 93-097, 21 May 1993, p. 68. The full text is in *Sakartvelos Respublik'a*, 15 June 1993, p. 3. The treaty recognizes mutual territorial integrity (important for Georgia), and declares that each state will refrain from supporting any action which "can be directed" against the interests of the other. This suggests neutrality on the question of Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia. Article 3 declares that no party or organization is permitted in either state which threatens the economic or political interests of the other. This would mean Georgia could move against Krunk with Armenia's sanction and that the Azerbaijanis would be prevented from recruiting coethnics on Georgian territory for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Article 4 forbids the joining of any organization or bloc directed against the other, probably meant to prevent a close Georgian-Azerbaijani alliance. Article 5 provides for mutual consultation on security issues and Article 6 guarantees civil rights and equality to all nationalities within each state, a demonstration of Armenia's concern for Armenians in Georgia. Article 9 guarantees unimpeded transit of goods to each state, another Armenian concern that causes constant friction between the two states.
45. "Armenia Appeals to Georgia to Safeguard Pipeline and Movement of Cargo," AGBU-Armenian Information Service, AIS Daily News Summary, 14 Feb. 1994. Russian television news reported Georgia would only guarantee regular gas deliveries to Armenia if Yerevan agreed to help pay off Tbilisi's multibillion ruble bill for gas supplied from Turkmenistan. Georgia has denied this. United Press International (UPI) 14 Feb. 1994; TASS 15 Feb. 1994 in AGBU-Armenian Information Service, AIS Daily News Summary, 15 Feb. 1994.
46. See "Political, Economic Agreements Signed with Iran," FBIS-SOV, 92-117, 17 June 1992, p. 69.
47. The absence of an Armenian chargé d'affaires in Tbilisi until the end of 1992 reflected the lack of urgency in Georgian-Armenian relations. In February 1993, after

- Georgia and Azerbaijan signed a friendship treaty formalizing their relations, Georgia had treaties with Iran, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, but none with Armenia, except one signed by the disgraced Gamsakhurdia government in July 1991. Shevardnadze suggested the lack of movement in Georgian-Armenian relations was "simply [because we] do not have time to formulate our contacts and common interests in agreements" ("Shevardnadze Interviewed on Relations with Russia," FBIS-SOV, 93-009, 14 Jan. 1993, p. 72), but one Georgian official in a private communication suggested that the fault was Armenia's. He stated that a Georgian-Armenian treaty was prepared alongside the Georgian-Azerbaijani treaty, but that Armenia was pressured by Russia to sign nothing until the Abkhazian situation was settled. Russia also held back on signing any formal treaty with Georgia until February 1994. I am thankful to Patrick Hillery for passing on this information.
48. "Shevardnadze Asks Elchibey to Expedite Oil Supplies," FBIS-SOV, 92-231, 1 Dec. 1992, p. 42.
 49. "Shevardnadze Interviewed on Relations with Russia," FBIS-SOV, 93-009, 14 Jan. 1993, p. 72.
 50. Armen Khanbabian, "Mifotvorchestvo kak prichina natsional'noi tragedii," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 3 Feb. 1993, p. 3.
 51. In another echo of the strategic conflicts of 1918-20, the Dashnaksutium delegation at a Caucasian Forum in June 1993 opposed the idea of a "Caucasian Home" because of its "anti-Russian" flavor. As in 1918-20, it isolated itself from Georgian and Azerbaijani efforts at pan-Caucasian cooperation. Currently, the Dashnaksutium is in opposition, but the reluctance to enter all-Caucasian agreements, despite some rhetoric to the contrary, is shared by the Armenian government. See "Armenia Thinks Caucasian Home Concept Premature," FBIS-SOV, 93-118, 22 June 1993, p. 3.
 52. For details of the agreements with Iran and Turkey, see "Communique Signals 'Bright Prospects' for Ties with Iran," FBIS-SOV, 93-015, 26 Jan. 1993, pp. 77; "Friendship Treaty Concluded with Turkey" FBIS-SOV, 92-157, 13 Aug. 1992 pp. 70-71.
 53. See "Text of Friendship Treaty with Azerbaijan," FBIS-SOV, 93-027, 11 Feb. 1993, pp. 54-57.
 54. See "Turkish Foreign Minister, Shevardnadze Meet," FBIS-SOV, 92-100, 22 May 1992, p. 60. ■